Process
Status Items Highlights Done See section below Claims None Questions None Output None
Highlights
PageĀ 23
It is easier to rise from poverty in Canada or Germany, Denmark, and other European countries than it is in the United States.
This is at odds with the long-standing faith that mobility is Americaās answer to inequality. The United States, we tell ourselves, can afford to less about inequality than the class-bound societies of Europe because here, it is possible to rise. Seventy percent of Americans believe the poor can make it out of poverty on their own, while only 35 percent of Europeans think so. This faith in mobility may explain why the U.S. has a less-generous welfare state than most major European countries.
āļø A cultural ideal of making it if you work hard has translated to limited welfare support. The propaganda is strong, but the reality is far from that.
š (PageĀ 23)
PageĀ 24
Morally, it is unclear why the talented deserve the outsize rewards that marketdriven societies lavish on the successful. Central to the case for the meritocratic ethic is the idea that we do not deserve to be rewarded, or held back, based on factors beyond our control. But is having (or lacking) certain talents really our own doing? If not, it is hard to see why those who rise thanks to their talents deserve greater rewards than those who may be equally hardworking but less endowed with the gifts a market society happens to prize.
āļø Digging into the core issue.. Are people only deserving of reward if theyāre talented or skillful.. And how do we decide which talents are desired.. And what does that say about talents that are important but not ādesiredā, and how thatās not rewarded.
š (PageĀ 24)
PageĀ 25
Meritocratic hubris reflects the tendency of winners to inhale too deeply of their success, to forget the luck and good fortune that helped them on their way. It is the smug conviction of those who land on top that they deserve their fate, and that those on the bottom deserve theirs, too. This attitude is the moral companion of technocratic politics.
āļø The side effect of meritocracy.. Hubris and humiliation. Arrogance and resentment.
š (PageĀ 25)
PageĀ 28
Our technocratic version of meritocracy severs the link between merit and moral judgment. In the domain of the economy, it simply assumes that the common good is defined by GDP, and that the value of peopleās contributions consists in the market value of the goods or services they sell. In the domain of government, it assumes that merit means technocratic expertise.
This can be seen in the growing role of economists as policy advisors, the increasing reliance on market mechanisms to define and achieve the public good, and the failure of public discourse to address the large moral and civic questions that should be at the center of political debate: What should we do about rising inequality? What is the moral significance of national borders? What makes for the dignity of work? What do we owe one another as citizens?
āļø Supposedly, traditional political meritocracy consider merits as those that help govern, and include moral and civic virtue.
Modern day, merit is not moral-related. Itās about economy, GDP, etc.
Less about cultivating solidarity and bonds of citizenship, more about satisfying consumer preference as measured by GDP.
š (PageĀ 28)